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Introduction 
Each year in the United States, roughly six thousand infants are 
born with trisomy 21—a genetic disorder more commonly known as 
Down Syndrome.1 In the United States, this genetic abnormality 
 
1. Data and Statistics on Down Syndrome, Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/ downsyndrome/ 
data.html [https://perma.cc/PGX2-ELYT] (last updated Dec. 5, 2019). 
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accounts for roughly one in 750 live births.2 It is estimated that nearly 
250,700 individuals with Down Syndrome currently live in the United 
States.3 
The prevalence of Down Syndrome in the United States is strikingly 
different than that of Iceland. With a population of 333,000, Iceland 
typically has only one or two children born with Down Syndrome each 
year.4 The reason, experts claim, is that Icelandic women’s abortion 
rate for children with an in utero Down Syndrome diagnosis is nearly 
100%.5 Denmark has a similarly high abortion rate for in utero Down 
Syndrome diagnoses, at 98%.6 The United Kingdom has a 90% abortion 
rate for in utero Down Syndrome diagnoses.7 These high abortion rates 
have essentially eradicated Down Syndrome from these countries’ pop–
ulations. In comparison, the United States has a much lower abortion 
rate for an in utero Down Syndrome diagnosis, at 67%.8 
Experts have expressed concern about the high abortion rates for 
Down Syndrome fetuses in Iceland and Denmark. Geneticist Kari 
Stefansson, whose company “has studied nearly the entire Icelandic 
population’s genomes,” said that the high abortion rate “re–
flects . . . relatively heavy-handed genetic counseling . . . . [Genetic 
counselors] are having [an] impact on decisions that are not 
medical . . . .”9 Hulda Hjartardottir, head of the Prenatal Diagnosis 
Unit at Landspitali University Hospital in Iceland, argues that her 
genetic counselors attempt to be as neutral as possible, but concedes 
that for some, “just offering the [prenatal genetic] test is pointing 
 
2. Stylianos E. Antonarakis, Robert Lyle, Emmanouil T. Dermitzakis, Alexandre 
Reymond & Samuel Deutsch, Chromosome 21 and Down Syndrome: From 
Genomics to Pathophysiology, 5 Nature Revs. Genetics 725, 725 (2004). 
3. Angela P. Presson, Ginger Partyka, Kristin M. Jensen, Owen J. Devine, Sonja 
A. Rasmussen, Linda L. McCabe & Edward R. B. McCabe, Current Estimate 
of Down Syndrome Population Prevalence in the United States, 163 J. 
Pediatrics 1163, 1167 (2013). 
4. Jillian Quinones & Arijeta Lajka, “What Kind of Society Do You Want to 
Live In?”: Inside the Country Where Down Syndrome Is Disappearing, CBS 




7. George F. Will, The Real Down Syndrome Problem: Accepting Genocide, 




8. Quinones & Lajka, supra note 4. 
9. Id. 
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[women] towards a certain direction.”10 Furthermore, in Iceland the 
medical community considers Down Syndrome a deformity, which 
legally allows for women to obtain an abortion later in gestation than 
would normally be permitted.11 
Iceland and other European countries provide a unique look into 
the effects that making genetic screenings part of routine parental care 
can have on a woman’s decision to abort a genetically abnormal fetus. 
As mentioned, the rate of abortion in the United States for Down 
Syndrome fetuses is much lower than some European countries. But 
studies have shown that women’s attitudes toward prenatal genetic 
testing are becoming more positive.12 There are two main reasons for 
this shift: first, these tests are available much earlier in a woman’s 
pregnancy; and second, the tests are less invasive and safer for the 
fetus.13 These studies indicate that pregnant women have a high interest 
in these earlier and non-invasive prenatal genetic tests.14 It is therefore 
possible that, as non-invasive genetic testing becomes more widely 
available in the United States, abortion rates for Down Syndrome 
fetuses would increase in the United States as they have in countries 
like Iceland and Denmark. 
The ethical conundrum that this increased rate of abortion presents 
in the United States is straightforward. On one hand, given our nation’s 
history with eugenics and treating those with disabilities “differently 
and pejoratively,” there is a state interest in now protecting those with 
Down Syndrome in our population.15 Bioethicist David Wasserman 
argues that “[u]nlike people with obsolete skills, but like people of color, 




12. See, e.g., Rachel V. van Schendel, Johanna H. Kleinveld, Wybo J. Dondorp, 
Eva Pajkrt, Danielle R. M. Timmermans, Kim C. A. Holtkamp, Margreet 
Karsten, Anne L. Vlietstra, Augusta M. A. Lachmeijer & Lidewij Henneman, 
Attitudes of Pregnant Women and Male Partners Towards Non-Invasive 
Prenatal Testing and Widening the Scope of Prenatal Screening, 22 Eur. J. 
Hum. Genetics 1345, 1347 (2014); Junko Yotsumoto, Akihiko Sekizawa, 
Keiko Koide, Yuditiya Purwosunu, Kiyotake Ichizuka, Ryu Matsuoka, 
Hiroshi Kawame & Takashi Okai, Attitudes Toward Non-Invasive Prenatal 
Diagnosis Among Pregnant Women and Health Professionals in Japan, 32 
Prenatal Diagnosis 674, 678 (2012). 
13. See Yotsumoto et al., supra note 12, at 678 (finding that women found 
these factors helped to relieve their anxiety during pregnancy). 
14. See van Schendel et al., supra note 12, at 1347 (noting that many women 
participants felt it would be easier to decide to abort if the result was known 
earlier because a less intense bond was formed between mother and child). 
15. Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory 
or Compatible?, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 328 (2003). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
A Woman’s Choice? 
850 
society, and the disadvantages they face reflect their devaluation.”16 
But on the other hand, the right to privacy has been recognized as a 
fundamental right by the Supreme Court for decades.17 The Supreme 
Court has recognized that a woman’s choice to continue a pregnancy is 
so personal that she has the right, up until a certain point in gestation, 
to abort the fetus if she wishes.18 Though the Supreme Court has ruled 
that the government can assert a preference through waiting periods 
and required physician speech, the ultimate decision is still with the 
woman.19 Raising a child with a Down Syndrome diagnosis is much 
different than raising a genetically normal child, and many would argue 
the choice should remain with the woman. 
Some states recently have determined that their interest in 
preserving the life of those diagnosed prenatally with Down Syndrome 
outweighs a woman’s right to choose. These laws place criminal liability 
on physicians who knowingly perform abortion procedures for women 
who are seeking the procedure “in part”20 or “solely”21 because of a 
prenatal genetic diagnosis of Down Syndrome. It is crucial to consider 
how placing criminal liability on physicians may undermine how they 
interact with women seeking abortions. Such changes in the doctor-
patient interaction likely result in an undue burden upon a woman’s 
right to seek a pre-viability abortion.22 
 
16. David Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in Disability, Difference, 
Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public 
Policy 147, 175 (Anita Silvers, David Wasserman & Mary B. Mahowald 
eds., 1998). 
17. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) 
(describing abortion as a liberty interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 
(1973) (“[T]he right of personal privacy includes the abortion deci–
sion . . . .”). 
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
19. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (recognizing a legitimate government interest in 
reducing the risk that a woman will choose to abort and allowing state-
mandated disclosures to promote informed consent); see also Tex. Med. 
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (noting that requiring disclosure of truthful information does 
not pose an undue burden); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. 
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that the 
state can require a physician to provide non-misleading information to a 
woman seeking an abortion). 
20. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10 (Supp. 2020). 
21. Ind. Code § 16-34-4-6 (Supp. 2020). 
22. These laws also place a significant burden on physicians, but courts have 
been less willing to recognize an abortion providers’ interest in challenging 
state abortion restrictions. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. 
Hodges, 917 F.3d 908, 916 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (explaining that there 
is no constitutional right to perform an abortion). Thus, the unconsti–
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This Note will argue that Down Syndrome abortion bans are 
unconstitutional under the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey23 undue-burden test because of the harmful 
impact they have on the doctor-patient relationship. Part I of this Note 
provides a background on the current abortion landscape in the United 
States and explores how the Supreme Court has defined an unduly 
burdensome restriction. Part II illustrates the changing landscape in 
prenatal medical technologies and argues that women can now choose 
to have abortions earlier and with less risk. Part III explores the 
language of different states’ restrictions and what these restrictions 
would look like in practice. Part IV argues that imposing criminal 
liability on a physician based on a woman’s subjective motivations to 
seek an abortion has the potential to seriously degrade the doctor-
patient relationship and impede the ability for a woman to give 
informed consent. Finally, Part V briefly discusses other implications 
Down Syndrome abortion bans have on a woman’s right to choose. 
These discussions lead to the conclusion that restrictive abortion bans 
on Down Syndrome fetuses are unconstitutional under the current legal 
framework. 
I. Abortion Under Attack in the United States 
The legality of abortion in the United States has had a complicated 
history. The pivotal case Roe v. Wade,24 decided in 1973, affirmed that 
abortion was protected under the fundamental right to privacy.25 But 
the Supreme Court made clear that this right was not absolute.26 Justice 
Blackmun noted that there came a point in a woman’s pregnancy where 
the state’s interest in life outweighed a woman’s right to choose.27 The 
Court therefore created the trimester framework, which allowed women 
to abort any time up until the third trimester.28 During the third 
 
tutionality of these laws rest on the undue burden which they place on the 
pregnant woman seeking care. 
23. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
25. Id. at 153. 
26. Id. at 154. 
27. Id. at 163. For an interesting look at Justice Blackmun’s personal medical 
research on pregnancy to determine when the state interest should outweigh 
the privacy interest of the woman, see Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: 
The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester Framework, 51 Am. J. Legal 
Hist. 505, 513–26 (2011). 
28. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
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trimester, abortions were only permitted if there was significant risk to 
maternal health.29 
In 1992, the Supreme Court significantly altered the standard 
courts use to analyze abortion restrictions through its decision in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.30 The case 
arose as a challenge to Pennsylvania’s restrictions on abortion which 
included requirements that women wait twenty-four hours after a 
consultation, provide spousal notice, and receive parental consent if 
under the age of eighteen.31 In a plurality opinion written by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the Court endorsed the basic holding 
of Roe, that a woman has a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy 
that protects the right to choose to have an abortion.32 However, the 
Court did away with the trimester framework in favor of a viability 
standard, which allows for the cutoff to change as medicine advances.33 
Significantly, Casey reaffirmed and recognized a state’s interest in 
protecting unborn life and extended to the states considerable power to 
exercise this right.34 In doing so, the Court established the undue-
burden test for determining the constitutionality of state restrictions on 
abortions.35 Of this test, the Court wrote, “a statute which, while 
furthering . . . [a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be con–
sidered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”36 Moreover, 
“[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of 
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion 
impose an undue burden on the right.”37 
Since Casey, the Supreme Court has further defined the meaning of 
what is an “undue burden” in specific situations, but there is still 
confusion because little guidance has emerged on what types of 
restrictions constitute such an undue burden.38 Though clear and 
convincing evidence of maternal health benefits is required to justify an 
abortion restriction, there has been little direction to show how strong 
 
29. Id. 
30. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
31. Id. at 844. 
32. Id. at 868–69. 
33. Id. at 870. 
34. Id. at 875–76. 
35. Id. at 876. 
36. Id. at 877. 
37. Id. at 878. 
38. Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
and the Future of Abortion Law, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 79. 
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or how scientifically certain the state’s evidence must be to successfully 
overcome the undue-burden test.39 
In 2000, the Supreme Court applied the undue burden test to a 
state statute prohibiting partial birth abortions in Stenberg v. 
Carhart.40 This case involved a Nebraska statue that criminalized 
partial birth abortions.41 The statute in question defined a partial birth 
abortion as “an abortion procedure in which the person performing the 
abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing 
the unborn child and completing the delivery.”42 The Supreme Court 
held that the statute was unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the 
statute provided no health exception to protect the life of the mother. 
Second, the statute was unconstitutional because banning “partial birth 
abortion” would include prohibit the dilation and extraction pro–
cedure.43 This type of procedure is the preferred method for abortions 
performed later in gestation, but still before the Casey viability point.44 
Alternative methods include inducement of labor or a caesarian section 
abortion, but medical professionals agree that the dilation and 
extraction procedure is safest for most women.45 Therefore, the Court 
held that by criminalizing this type of abortion procedure, providers 
would “fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment”46 for perform–
ing a pre-viability abortion and thus the statute placed an undue 
burden on women seeking a legal abortion.47 
Less than seven years later, the Supreme Court again applied the 
undue-burden test, this time to a federal partial birth abortion 
restriction law, in Gonzales v. Carhart.48 The case arose as a challenge 
to the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act.49 The Act was similar to the 
Nebraska statute in that it criminalized “partial birth abortions,” but 
different because it created an exemption for health risks, and more 
clearly defined the procedure to still allow for other late-term 
 
39. Id. 
40. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
41. Id. at 921–22 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-328(1) (West 2020)). 
42. Id. at 922 (quoting the former version of current Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 28-326(8) (West 2020)). 
43. Id. at 930. 
44. Id. at 924. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 945. 
47. Id. at 945–46. 
48. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
49. Id. at 132. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
A Woman’s Choice? 
854 
abortions.50 The Court upheld the restriction, noting that the federal 
government has a “legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and 
promoting fetal life.”51 The Court reasoned that because the federal 
government had properly addressed the concerns from the Nebraska 
statute, the restrictions no longer placed an undue burden on women 
seeking lawful abortions.52 The seemingly contrary decisions in Stenberg 
and Gonzales resulted in differing methods of analyzing an undue 
burden at the circuit court level.53 
In 2016, the Supreme Court gave the Casey undue-burden test more 
credibility than ever before in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,54 
when the Court held Texas laws requiring admitting privileges were 
unconstitutional.55 The case was a challenge to a Texas statute that 
required doctors performing abortions to obtain admitting privileges to 
a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location the abortion was 
being performed, and the abortion clinic to meet the requirements for 
an ambulatory surgical center.56 The Supreme Court, per Justice 
Breyer, noted that Texas could not cite a single instance where the 
admitting privileges helped a woman receive better care.57 The Court 
wrote, “[t]he admitting-privileges requirement does not serve any 
relevant credentialing function.”58 When the law went into effect, 
almost half of Texas’s abortion clinics were forced to close.59 Of the 
ambulatory surgical center requirements, the Supreme Court wrote that 
because “abortions typically involve either the administration of 
medicines or procedures performed through the natural opening of the 
 
50. Id. at 132–33. 
51. Id. at 145. 
52. Id. at 147. 
53. Gillian Metzger, Symposium: Hanging in the Balance, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 
6, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/symposium-hang 
ing-in-the-balance/ [https://perma.cc/3T7G-JST9] (explaining that the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits adopted a balancing test in the undue burden 
analysis in which the court must weigh the burdens of the restriction with 
the health benefits to the woman actually achieved; while the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Circuits opted for a rational-basis analysis); see also Becca 
Kendis, Note, Faute de Mieux: Recognizing and Accepting Whole Woman’s 
Health for Its Strengths and Weaknesses, 69 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1007, 
1019–21 (2019) (explaining the uncertainty at the circuit level in applying 
the undue burden analysis). 
54. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
55. Id. at 2300. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 2311–12. 
58. Id. at 2313. 
59. Id. 
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birth canal, which is itself not sterile”60 the standards imposed by the 
statute are “not necessary” to provide safe care to women seeking an 
abortion.61 In a five-to-three decision,62 the Court held that the statute 
significantly impeded abortion providers from performing legal 
abortions, which therefore placed an undue burden upon women seeking 
such abortions.63 By requiring clear and convincing evidence of the 
benefits a restriction provided women, the Court significantly strength–
ened abortion protections. 
These Supreme Court decisions have supplied the public with a 
greater understanding of the undue-burden test and what restrictions 
on abortion access will be seen as going too far. But abortion rights are 
always at the forefront American politics.64 With a shift in the Court’s 
composition in recent years and a much more conservative bench now 
in the majority, many are anxious to see what the Court does with the 
 
60. Id. at 2316. 
61. Id. In making this statement, the Court also highlighted that the mortality 
rate in Texas resulting from abortions was about one death every two years. 
The Court noted that childbirth has a fourteen times higher likelihood of 
death, and Texas allowed for midwives to oversee births in non-surgical 
settings. Colonoscopies have a mortality rate ten times higher than that of 
abortions, and liposuction has a mortality rate of twenty-eight times that 
of abortions. Texas routinely allows for these procedures to take place 
outside a surgical center. Thus, Texas’ argument that the statute provides 
for safer patient care is not persuasive. Id. at 2315. 
62. Many pro-life supporters anticipated that the Supreme Court would liken 
the undue-burden analysis to a rational-basis test. This test was seen as an 
easier burden of proof for states in upholding abortion restrictions. But the 
lopsided vote, coupled with the Supreme Court’s direct rejection of many 
arguments posed by the Americans United for Life’s amicus brief, indicate 
that the Supreme Court undoubtedly strengthened abortion rights and the 
protections that the undue burden analysis provides women. Ziegler, supra 
note 38, at 105–08. 
63. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318. Justice Thomas dissented in 
Whole Woman’s Health, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing. 
Id. at 2321–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts also dissented 
on the grounds that the abortion providers had failed to show with sufficient 
evidence that the Texas law forced the closures of abortion clinics. Id. at 
2337 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
64. See, e.g., Jeremy Peters, As Passions Flare in Abortion Debate, Many 
Americans Say ‘It’s Complicated,’ N.Y. Times (June 15, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/abortion-debate-pennsylvania 
.html [https://perma.cc/8RWW-EG3U]; Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Here’s 
Why the Anti-Abortion Movement is Escalating, FiveThirtyEight (May 
21, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/we-categorized-hundreds-of-
abortion-restrictions-heres-why-the-anti-abortion-movement-is-escalating/ 
[https://perma.cc/A67A-G4WS]; What’s Going On in the Fight over US 
Abortion Rights?, BBC News (June 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-us-canada-47940659 [https://perma.cc/AQ32-VGHR]. 
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Casey framework.65 States have passed dramatic abortion restrictions 
in recent years that, if upheld, would significantly erode the funda–
mental holdings of Roe and Casey.66  
In June of 2020, the Court decided June Medical Services v. 
Russo,67 which challenged a Louisiana statute that required abortion 
providers to have admitting privileges to nearby hospitals, privileges 
which, according to the plaintiffs, only one physician was able to 
obtain.68 Though the state regulation was strikingly similar to the one 
at issue in Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court struck down the 
statue in a close four-to-one-to-four decision.69 Justice Breyer, joined by 
the three more liberal justices, wrote the plurality opinion and argued 
the statue was unconstitutional under the same reasoning the Court 
applied in Whole Woman’s Health.70 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in 
the result as the deciding vote and only conservative justice to vote in 
favor of striking down the statute, but he wrote separately. He argued 
that Whole Woman’s Health was decided incorrectly, but that the 
statute in the present case must be overturned because Whole Woman’s 
Health provided a clear precedent.71 The remaining conservative justices 
all wrote individual dissenting opinions.72 This was a major victory for 
 
65. Linda Greenhouse, What Does Amy Coney Barrett Mean for the Supreme 
Court?, N.Y. Times (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/ 
22/opinion/sunday/supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett.html [https://perma 
.cc/U9HB-UAYH]. 
66. See Marcia Coyle, 4 Supreme Court Cases That Could Erode Roe v. Wade, 
PBS (May 17, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/4-
supreme-court-abortion-cases-that-could-erode-roe-v-wade [https://perma. 
cc/Z7RY-2VYX] (analyzing legal challenges to various state laws that have 
the potential to undermine the current abortion framework). 
67. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). 
68. Id. at 2113. In February of 2019, the Supreme Court received an emergency 
request from June Medical Services to block enforcement of the law after 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the law was constitutional and enforceable. The 
request was granted, but four justices dissented: Justice Alito, Justice 
Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Thomas. Chief Justice Roberts 
was the only conservative justice to side with blocking the law from taking 
effect. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019). 
69. June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020) (plurality opinion). 
70. Id. at 2109. 
71. Id. at 2133–34. 
72. Id. at 2111. Justice Thomas argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not provide women the right to have an abortion. Id. at 2150 (Thomas, J. 
dissenting). Justice Alito instead focused on the issue of standing, arguing 
that the regulated party could not stand in to assert the rights of the third 
party. Id. at 2153 (Alito, J. dissenting). Justice Gorsuch argued the Court 
should have considered the reasons the legislature passed the law. Id. at 
2171 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). Justice Kavanaugh argued that there needed 
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abortion rights activists, and the Casey undue burden framework 
remains in place for the time being.  
In the months since June Medical, it has become clear that Chief 
Justice Robert’s concurrence has significantly confused lower courts. 
Some circuits have held that Chief Justice Robert’s concurring opinion 
effectively overruled Whole Woman’s Health under the Marks rule,73 
while other circuits have held that June Medical yielded no controlling 
opinion.74 With Justice Amy Coney Barrett confirmed in October of 
202075 and the Court granting certiorari to hear the constitutionality of 
a Mississippi law that bans most abortions after fifteen weeks,76 many 
Americans are curious how the Court will rule on abortion regulations 
moving forward.77  
 
to be more factfinding as to the effect the law had on access to abortions. 
Id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting). 
73. The Marks rule is derived from Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
The petitioners in the case argued that a recent Supreme Court decision 
was not controlling because it did not yield a majority opinion. Id. at 190. 
But Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded “the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .” Id. at 192–93. 
However, the Marks rule has proven difficult for the lower courts to 
consistently apply. See Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1942 (2019) (arguing the Marks rule should be discarded and we 
should require a majority to reach binding precedent); Ryan C. Williams, 
Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 
Stan. L. Rev. 795, 814–15 (2017) (arguing for a shared agreement approach, 
which is a clarification of the Marks rule so it is not as confusing as it 
currently is).  
74. Compare Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020), reh’g en 
banc denied (Dec. 15, 2020); Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512 
(6th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (holding that Chief Justice Robert’s concurrence 
in June Medical is controlling), to Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 978 
F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated by 978 
F.3d 974 (5th Cir. 2020); Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky v. 
Box, 991 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that June Medical yielded no 
controlling opinion).  
75. Barbara Sprunt, Amy Coney Barrett Confirmed to the Supreme Court, 
Takes Constitutional Oath, NPR (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.npr.org/ 
2020/10/26/927640619/senate-confirms-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme 
-court.  
76. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 951 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 
2020), cert. granted (2021).  
77. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Abortion Case Challenging Roe 
v. Wade, N.Y. Times (May 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/ 
05/17/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-abortion-case-challenging-roe-v-
wade.html (interviewing both pro-life and pro-choice activists for their take 
on the Supreme Court granting review).  
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II. An Undue Burden for Some? Raising a Child        
with Down Syndrome 
Down Syndrome is a chromosomal anomaly where a fetus has three 
copies of chromosome twenty-one instead of two.78 The average baby is 
born with forty-six chromosomes, but a baby with Down Syndrome 
instead has forty-seven chromosomes.79 There are three types of genetic 
abnormalities that cause Down Syndrome: trisomy 21, translocation, 
and mosaic. Almost 95% of cases involve trisomy 21, where each cell 
has three copies of chromosome twenty-one; 3% of cases involve an 
extra chromosome 21 that is translocated to another location of the 
DNA code; and mosaic Down Syndrome is the rarest and found in only 
2% of cases, where some cells have the normal number of chromosomes 
while others have a trisomy.80 It is estimated Down Syndrome occurs 
naturally in one in every 750 live births.81 
Down Syndrome is caused by an abnormal cell division, meaning it 
is not inherited from either parent.82 Because it is caused by an 
abnormal cell division, there is no test to determine if one is a “carrier” 
for the genetic abnormality. However, there is strong evidence that 
shows that maternal age is an external factor that can increase one’s 
chance of having a child with Down Syndrome.83 One study, published 
by researchers at Emory University, found that a mother between 
thirty-five to thirty-nine years old is four to five times more likely to 
have a child born with Down Syndrome compared to a mother who is 
twenty to twenty-four years old.84 
 
78. Facts About Down Syndrome, Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/ birthdefects/downsyndrome. 
html [https://perma.cc/B9CT-4EJ2] (last updated Dec. 5, 2019). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Antonarakis et al., supra note 2, at 725. It is estimated that trisomy 21 is 
responsible for one in forty-three spontaneous abortions. Accordingly, 
because of the high self-abortion rates, it is very difficult for researchers 
to determine how often a trisomy naturally occurs. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Facts About Down Syndrome, supra note 78. 
84. Emily Graves Allen, Sallie B. Freeman, Charlotte Druschel, Charlotte A. 
Hobbs, Leslie A. O’Leary, Paul A. Romitti, Marjorie H. Royle, Claudine 
P. Torfs & Stephanie L. Sherman, Maternal Age and Risk for Trisomy 21 
Assessed by the Origin of Chromosome Nondisjunction: A Report from 
the Atlanta and National Down Syndrome Projects, 125 Hum. Genetics 
41, 47 (2009). 
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The impact Down Syndrome has on an individual varies 
significantly on a case-by-case basis.85 Most Down Syndrome individuals 
share similar physical features such as a flattened face, a shorter neck, 
and poor muscle tone.86 They typically have a moderately lower IQ than 
individuals without Down Syndrome and tend to speak slower.87 That 
said, many individuals with Down Syndrome go on to lead fulfilling 
lives. The life expectancy has increased dramatically over the last 
several decades and is now forty-seven years.88 Many individuals are 
able to find fulfilling work, in part thanks to companies with Down 
Syndrome inclusion programs.89 
However, raising a child with Down Syndrome is a significant 
undertaking and lasts well beyond the traditional eighteen-year 
responsibility. Down Syndrome individuals often have other health 
issues associated with their trisomy 21, most notably heart defects and 
sleep apnea, which can cause significant problems later in life.90 
Depending on how much Down Syndrome affects an individual’s IQ, 
those with Down Syndrome may have difficulty living independently. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, no person with a disability can be denied participation 
in services, programs, or activities of any public entity.91 But the 
 
85. As is discussed infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text, it is difficult to 
make sweeping generalizations about the quality of life those with Down 
Syndrome may have. 
86. Facts About Down Syndrome, supra note 78. 
87. Id. 
88. Data and Statistics on Down Syndrome, supra note 1. 
89. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz & Hailey Mensik, Not Just a Feel-Good Step: Businesses 
are Increasingly Hiring People With Disabilities, and it’s Helping the Bottom 
Line, Chi. Trib. (July 28, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.chicago tribune 
.com/business/ct-biz-disability-employment-20180723-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/K55Q-M5JL]; see also #DSWORKS Corporate Roundtable, Nat’l 
Down Syndrome Soc’y, https://www.ndss.org/work/dsworks-campaign-
roundtable/ [https://perma.cc/WYW3-4NFS] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) 
(explaining the organization’s initiative to partner with national businesses to 
provide work opportunities for Down Syndrome individuals). 
90. Facts About Down Syndrome, supra note 78. Sleep apnea is associated with 
high blood pressure, heart attack, and stroke. How Does Sleep Affect Your 
Heart Health?, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, https:// 
www.cdc.gov/features/sleep-heart-health/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z 
B7B-353U] (last updated Dec. 3. 2018). 
91. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 589–90 (1999). But the Court made two 
observations of the exclusion of those with disabilities from public life. First, 
the “institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from 
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so 
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.” Id. 
at 600. Second, “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the 
everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social 
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practicality of the matter is that they may not be able to pass the 
requisite tests to be able get their driver’s license, to give an example. 
Although prenatal genetic testing has improved greatly over the past 
several decades, there is no way to determine prenatally how much 
Down Syndrome will affect an individual’s IQ.92 Therefore, for many 
parents, a prenatal Down Syndrome diagnosis brings great concern and 
uncertainty as to what their lives may look like raising a child with 
Down Syndrome. 
The United States also has a troubled history in accepting those 
with Down Syndrome. Up until the mid-twentieth century, children 
born with Down Syndrome were placed in state institutions within days 
of their birth.93 Over thirty states during this time passed laws that 
allowed for the sterilization of the mentally disabled.94 It is estimated 
that in total, state governments involuntarily sterilized more than 
 
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, 
and cultural enrichment.” Id. at 601. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that the requirement of 
a building permit for a group home for the intellectually disabled was based 
on an irrational prejudice and therefore invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
92. Facts About Down Syndrome, supra note 78. 
93. Jon Henley, ‘There’s Places for Children Like Him’: How Attitudes to Down 
Syndrome Changed for the Better, The Guardian (Oct. 4, 2007, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/oct/04/socialexclusion.medici
neandhealth [https://perma.cc/N235-ZMEL]. 
94. Ala. Code § 309-704-10 (1919); 1929 Ariz. Sess. Laws 118–19; 1909 Cal. 
Stat. 1093–94; 1909 Conn. Pub. Acts 1135–36; 33 Del. Laws 152–53 (1923); 
1925 Idaho Sess. Laws 360; 1911 Iowa Acts 144–45; 1913 Kan. Sess. Laws 
525–26; 1925 Me. Laws 198; 1925 Minn. Laws 140–41; 1928 Miss. Laws 370–
73; 1923 Mont. Laws 534–37; 1917 N.H. Laws 704–05; 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 
504; 1913 N.D. Laws 63–66; 1931 Okla. Sess. Laws 80; 1917 S.D. Sess. Laws 
ch. 236 § 1–3, 378–79; 1925 Utah Laws 159; 1924 Va. Acts 569–70; 1929 W. 
Va. Acts 3–4; 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 971–72; Harry H. Laughlin, Eugenics 
Record Office, Bulletin No. 10B: Report of the Committee to 
Study and to Report on the Best Practical Means of Cutting 
Off the Defective Germ-Plasm in the American Population 14 
(1914) (describing Indiana’s law); id. at 27–28 (describing Michigan’s law); 
id. at 38–40 (describing Nebraska’s law and the Governor’s subsequent veto); 
id. at 23–25 (describing New York’s law); id. at 33–34 (describing Oregon’s 
law and the Governor’s subsequent veto); id. at 31–33 (describing 
Pennsylvania’s law and the Governor’s subsequent veto); id. at 34–37 
(describing Vermont’s law and the Governor’s subsequent veto); Lutz 
Kaelber, Georgia Eugenics, Univ. of Vt. https://www.uvm.edu/~lka 
elber/eugenics/GA/GA.html [https://perma.cc/S8XT-H3NJ] (last visited 
May 20, 2021) (describing Georgia’s law and the Governor’s subsequent 
veto). 
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65,000 disabled individuals.95 The Supreme Court held in Buck v. Bell96 
that these involuntary sterilizations were constitutional. In a now 
infamous opinion, Justice Holmes wrote, “Three generations of 
imbeciles are enough.”97 Buck v. Bell has never explicitly been 
overruled, but other cases have signaled a shift in ideology.98 Even so, 
it is an illustration of the tumultuous past those with disabilities faced 
in the United States. Though laws aimed at eliminating discrimination 
based on disabilities have significantly improved the quality of life for 
those living with Down Syndrome,99 social stigmas still persist.100 
Recent scientific advancements in prenatal genetic testing have 
allowed for women to receive earlier and more accurate prenatal genetic 
screenings. Developed in the 1960’s, amniocentesis had long been the 
method for prenatal genetic testing.101 An amniocentesis cannot be 
 
95. Andrea Pitzer, U.S. Eugenics Legacy: Ruling on Buck Sterilization Still 
Stands, USA Today (June 24, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/health/2009-06-23-eugenics-carrie-buck_N.htm?POE=click-refer 
[https://perma.cc/J9KM-GDTK]. It is also likely that sterilization laws 
disproportionally affected Down Syndrome women over Down Syndrome 
men. It was long believed that Down Syndrome men were infertile due to 
decreased spermatogenesis, however cases of Down Syndrome males 
fathering children have been reported. See Richard Sheridan, Juan Llerena 
Jr., Sally Matkins, Paul Debenham, Andrew Cawood & Martin Bobrow, 
Fertility in a Male with Trisomy 21, 26 J. Med. Genetics 294, 294 (1989) 
(acknowledging that it is widely accepted the Down Syndrome men are 
infertile but conducting a case study showing one Down Syndrome male 
fathering a child). 
96. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
97. Id. at 207. 
98. Pitzer, supra note 95; see also Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 
778 (Cal. 1985) (refusing to allow a guardian to have a mentally disabled 
female sterilized because there was a lack of evidence showing that other 
less-intrusive means of birth control were not available); In re Guardianship 
of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (Wash. 1980) (holding that guardian failed to 
meet burden of proof that sterilization would be in the disabled woman’s 
best interest). 
99. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018); 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 
(2018). But see Deborah Pergament, What Does Choice Really Mean?: 
Prenatal Testing, Disability, and Special Education Without Illusions, 23 
Health Matrix 56, 86–114 (2013) (critiquing current special education 
programs at public schools and indicating that families are turning more 
frequently to the private sector for help raise a child with disabilities). 
100. See Ranu Jain, David C. Thomasma & Rasa Ragas, Down Syndrome: Still 
a Social Stigma, 19 Am. J. Perinatology 99, 101 (2002) (reviewing case 
studies of how Down Syndrome infants were welcomed by family members). 
101. Maura Parker Quinlan, Amniocentesis: Indications and Risks, 10 AMA 
J. Ethics 304, 304 (2008). 
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performed prior to fifteen weeks of pregnancy.102 The test is performed 
by obtaining a sample of amniotic fluid to test the fetal DNA.103 Any 
time the amniotic sac is interrupted, there is risk to the fetus and the 
potential that the fetus will be lost.104 Many women refuse such a test 
if they have low risk for a genetic abnormality or if they know that 
even if there was a genetic abnormality, they would not abort.105 Studies 
also suggest that, because this test is performed later in pregnancy, 
abortion is often emotionally more difficult for a woman.106 Most women 
begin to perceive fetal movement between sixteen and twenty-five 
weeks.107 For many women, fetal movement represents a significant 
threshold in the pregnancy where the mother feels more connected to 
the fetus, and thus there are more reservations about ending a 
pregnancy.108 
Cell-free DNA testing is a newer technology that allows physicians 
to screen for genetic abnormalities as early as nine weeks into the 
pregnancy, with little risk to the mother.109 Research has found that a 
fetus’s DNA ends up in the blood stream of its mother.110 Thus, to test 
a fetus’s DNA, a technician only needs to draw a blood sample from 
the mother. Lab technicians are then able to screen for major genetic 
abnormalities, including Down Syndrome. If the cell-free DNA test 




104. Id. at 305. 
105. Pawel Sadlecki, Marek Grabiec, Pawel Walentowicz & Malgorzata 
Walentowicz-Sadlecka, Why Do Patients Decline Amniocentesis? Analysis 
of Factors Influencing the Decision to Refuse Invasive Prenatal Testing, 18 
BMC Pregnancy & Childbirth 174 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1186/ 
s12884-018-1812-3 [https://perma.cc/36CR-83V7]. 
106. See Carrie Purcell, Audrey Brown, Catriona Melville & Lisa M. McDaid, 
Women’s Embodied Experiences of Second Trimester Medical Abortion, 27 
Feminism & Psych. 163, 172–74 (2017) (suggesting that women seeking 
later-term abortions are ambivalent to their pregnancy at first and fetal 
movement made their pregnancy feel real). 
107. Id. at 173–74. 
108. Id. at 173–74 (noting some women’s pregnancies did not feel real until they 
felt the baby kick around sixteen weeks); see also van Schendel et al., supra 
note 12 at 1347 (hypothesizing that the further a pregnancy progressed, the 
more intense bond between a mother and fetus). 
109. Howard Cuckle, Peter Benn & Eugene Pergament, Cell-free DNA Screening 
for Fetal Aneuploidy as a Clinical Service, 48 Clinical Biochemistry 932, 
936 (2015). 
110. Id. at 933. 
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more tests to confirm the abnormality.111 This test completely changes 
the landscape of prenatal genetic testing. Pregnant mothers who 
participated in one study, when asked about the benefits of the newer 
genetic screenings, hypothesized that the earlier, non-invasive genetic 
testing would make decisions to terminate a pregnancy “easier because 
of [the] less-intense emotional bond between mother and her unborn 
child.”112 It is yet to be seen if these genetic testing improvements 
greatly increase the number of abortions based on a prenatal diagnosis 
of Down Syndrome. 
III. State Action Thus Far 
In recent years, advocates for Down Syndrome rights have 
championed legislation aimed at increasing information available to 
mothers who are carrying or recently delivered a child with Down 
Syndrome. Congress passed the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed 
Conditions Awareness Act in 2008.113 The law sought to provide 
information to parents whose fetus was given a positive diagnosis of 
Down Syndrome about the life experiences of those with the condition, 
the services available to aid families who have members with the 
condition, and the availability of adoption services.114 
Advocates started to push for legislation at the state level as well. 
As of February 2020, eighteen states have passed Down Syndrome 
information bills.115 These types of laws threaten one of the core 
 
111. Id. 
112. van Schendel et al., supra note 12, at 1347. 
113. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, ch. 1810, 
122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8). The law had 
bipartisan support in Congress, primarily because it is viewed as promoting 
both pro-life and pro-choice agendas through improving the dissemination 
of information to an expectant mother. Rebecca Dresser, Prenatal Testing 
and Disability: A Truce in the Culture Wars? 39 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 7, 
7–8 (2009). 
114. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8 (2018). 
115. Del. Code Ann. tit. 16 § 801B (West 2020); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 383.141 
(West 2020); 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 511/10 (West 2020); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 211.192 (West 2020); La. Stat. Ann § 40:1109:2 (2020); Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1642 (2019); Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen. 
§ 20-1502 (West 2020); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 70H (West 2020); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.471 (West 2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 191.923 (West 
2020); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 74-4104 (West 2020); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
26:2-195 (West 2020); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3701.69 (West 2020); 35 PA. 
Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 6243 (West 2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-1-1304 
(West 2020); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 161.652 (West 2019); 
Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-2403.01 (West 2020); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§18.50.170 (West 2020). For the most up-to-date information regarding Down 
Syndrome information laws, see Pro-Information Laws & Toolkit, Nat’l 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
A Woman’s Choice? 
864 
principles of genetic counseling—neutrality.116 Of these laws, one 
bioethicist wrote it was the signaling “of what may become many other 
efforts to insist that those involved in genetic testing, screening, and 
counseling move away from nominal ethical neutrality to a more 
disability-friendly normative message.”117 
Going beyond genetic-counseling requirements, some states have 
banned genetically driven abortions. In 2011, Arizona enacted 
legislation that made it a class-three felony for physicians to perform 
an abortion “based on the sex or race of the child.”118 Arkansas, Kansas, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and South Dakota have also enacted similar sex or race 
abortion bans.119 
Currently, twelve states have passed Down Syndrome abortion 
bans: Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah.120 
Most of these bans seem to mirror the language of statutes from other 
 
Down Syndrome Soc’y, https://www.ndss.org/advocate/ndss-legislative-
agenda/healthcare-research/pro-information-laws-toolkit/ [https://perma.cc 
/GA3V-R6RN] (last visited Nov. 29, 2020). 
116. Arthur L. Caplan, Chloe’s Law: A Powerful Legislative Movement Challeng–
ing a Core Ethical Norm of Genetic Testing, PLoS Biology, Aug. 2015, 
at 3 (2015). 
117. Id. 
118. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3603.02 (2020). At least one court has noted 
there does not appear to be a significant concern for sex-selection in the 
United States. Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region v. Parson, 408 
F. Supp. 3d 1049 (W.D. Mo. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-3134 (8th Cir. Oct. 
3, 2019). But in some countries where male children are preferred, like India, 
parents often try to sex-select their children, and laws have been passed to 
prevent such a practice. See Sital Kilantry & Arindam Nandi, Evaluating 
the Impact of the Indian Supreme Court Judgment on Sex-Selective Abortion 
18 (Cornell L. Sch. Res. Paper No. 19-24, 2011) (discussing the reasoning 
and lack of enforcement of India’s sex-selection ban). 
119. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1904 (2020); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6726 (West 
2020); Miss. Life Equality Act of 2020, H.B. 1295; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.038 
(West 2020); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-21.121 (West 2020); N.D. Cent. 
Code Ann. § 14-02.1-04.1 (West 2019); Okla. Stat. Ann. § 63-1-731.2(B) 
(West 2020); Pa. Stat. § 3204 (West 2020); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-
10.1 (West 2020). 
120. Ariz. S.B. 1457, 55th Leg., 1d Reg. (Ariz. 2021); Ark. Code. Ann. § 20-16-
2103 (West 2020); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-4-6 (West 2020); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 311.731 (West 2020); La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.1.2 (2020); 
Miss. Life Equality Act of 2020, H.B. 1295; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.052 
(West 2020); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-02.1-04.1 (West 2019); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10 (West 2020); S.D. H.B. 1110, 96th Leg., Sess. 694 
(S.D. 2021); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-217 (West 2020); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-7-302.4 (West 2020). As this Note was approaching publication, other 
states had proposed but not yet passed Down Syndrome abortion bans.  
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states, of which there are two approaches. Some states ban abortions 
“solely” because of Down Syndrome and other genetic abnormalities; 
others ban abortions “in part” because of Down Syndrome and other 
genetic abnormalities. Indiana and Ohio’s laws illustrate the different 
statutory approaches and provide insight as to how courts have 
analyzed their implications thus far. For the purposes of this Note, it is 
useful to analyze both and the consequences the language has on 
liability for physicians. 
A. Indiana’s Down Syndrome Abortion Ban 
The Indiana Down Syndrome abortion ban statute states that a 
physician may not perform an abortion “if the person knows that the 
pregnant woman is seeking an abortion solely because the fetus has 
been diagnosed with Down [S]yndrome or has a potential diagnosis of 
Down [S]yndrome.”121 Physicians face various forms of punishment for 
performing such an abortion. First, physicians who perform unlawful 
abortions commit a level five felony,122 which carries a sentence of one 
to six years in prison.123 Second, physicians may face disciplinary 
sanctions such as loss of license, suspension of license, formal reprimand, 
placement on probation status requiring regular reviews, and a fine.124 
Third, physicians may be held civilly liable for both wrongful death and 
discriminatory practices.125 Women who seek an abortion may not be 
prosecuted for violating the chapter or for conspiracy to violate the 
chapter.126 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana held that the law was unconstitutional.127 Indiana argued that 
the better prenatal genetic testing options allowed for an earlier and 
more accurate diagnosis of genetic abnormalities and that this was 
leading to an increased rate of abortion of Down Syndrome fetuses.128 
The district court rejected this argument, acknowledging the state 
interest in fetal life, but also noting that those interests are not strong 
 
121. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-4-6 (West 2020). 
122. Id. § 16-34-2-7 (West 2020). 
123. Id. § 35-50-2-6 (West 2020). 
124. Id. § 25-1-9-9 (West 2020). 
125. Id. § 16-34-4-9 (West 2020). The statute does not make readily apparent 
who would have standing to sue the physician in a civil case or who would 
have the ability to file a complaint with the Civil Rights Commission. 
126. Id. 
127. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of 
Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 861 (S.D. Ind. 2017), aff’d, 888 F.3d 300, 310 
(7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied in relevant part, 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019).  
128. Id. at 862. 
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enough to limit a woman’s right to choose to have a pre-viability 
abortion.129 The state also argued that Roe and Casey only protect a 
woman’s right to choose to have an abortion if the woman did not want 
a child generally, but this right did not extend to the right to choose 
to abort based on a genetic abnormality.130 The court also rejected this 
argument, finding no support for the argument in those cases.131 The 
district court noted that the woman’s right to choose was rooted in a 
right to privacy, which means the woman had a right to make 
important and personal decisions outside the eye of the state.132 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed.133 The Seventh Circuit wrote, “[n]othing in the Fourteenth 
Amendment or Supreme Court precedent allows the State to invade 
this privacy realm to examine the underlying basis for a woman’s 
decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability.”134 The Down 
Syndrome abortion provisions are “far greater than a substantial 
obstacle; they are absolute prohibitions on abortions prior to viability 
which the Supreme Court has clearly held cannot be imposed by the 
State.”135 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari on this question.136 Justice 
Thomas, concurring in the denial, wrote that the Supreme Court would 
soon need to take up this issue because “this law and other laws like it 
promote a State’s compelling interest in preventing abortion from 
becoming a tool of modern-day eugenics.”137 But Justice Thomas 
ultimately agreed not to take up the issue just yet, writing that further 
percolation could assist the Court in making a ruling later.138 Thus, 
Indiana’s Down Syndrome abortion ban has been permanently enjoined 
because it failed the Casey undue burden test. 
 
129. Id. at 866–67. 
130. Id. at 868. 
131. Id. at 869. 
132. Id. at 865–66. 
133. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of 
Health, 888 F.3d 300, 310 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part and denied 
in part, 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019). 
134. Id. at 307. 
135. Id. at 306 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
879 (1992)). 
136. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019). 
137. Id. at 1782–83 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
138. Id. at 1784 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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B. Ohio’s Down Syndrome Abortion Ban 
The Ohio statute bans abortions based “in part” because of a 
prenatal diagnosis of Down Syndrome.139 Any hint from the patient 
about a Down Syndrome diagnosis presents a concern that the patient 
is aborting the fetus “in part” because of the diagnosis. A physician 
proceeding with an abortion when he knows of a Down Syndrome 
diagnosis would potentially open himself or herself up to penalties. 
First, performance of an abortion in violation of the statute is a felony 
of the fourth degree.140 Second, the state medical board will revoke a 
physician’s license to practice.141 Third, a physician may be held civilly 
liable to any person or his or her representative for compensatory 
damages and attorney’s fees for any injury or death that results from 
the prohibited abortion.142 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
held that the state’s argument for antidiscrimination was just a new 
way of the state inserting its interest in the preservation of life, which 
under Casey is not sufficient to deny a woman an abortion pre-
viability.143 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on much the same 
basis.144 The majority wrote, “To give credence to the argument that 
an interest such as preventing discrimination or stigma may lay outside 
the interest in potential life and be considered separately to determine 
a women’s [sic] rights to abortion would be to ignore the unique 
condition of abortion recognized in Casey.”145 
However, after a rehearing en bac, the Sixth Circuit narrowly 
reversed in a nine-to-seven decision and held that the Down Syndrome 
abortion ban was constitutional.146 Judge Alice M. Batchelder, who was 
the lone dissent in the original three-judge panel, wrote the majority 
opinion. In the opinion, she explained, first, that there was no “per se 
right [to abortion] based on the stage of the pregnancy.”147 Second, she 
argued that Ohio’s interest in protecting Down Syndrome individuals 
from stigma and protecting women from physician coercion has nothing 
 
139. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10(B) (West 2006). 
140. Id. § 2919.10(C). 
141. Id. § 2919.10(D). 
142. Id. § 2919.10(E). 
143. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 748–49 (S.D. Ohio 2018). 
144. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 940 F.3d 318 (6th Cir.), vacated and reh’g 
en banc granted, 944 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2019). 
145. Id. at 324. 
146. Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2021) (en banc).  
147. Id. at 521.  
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to do with the viability of the fetus.148 Accordingly, the majority argued 
that the law allows for women to make their own choice about whether 
to abort a fetus with Down Syndrome without undue influence from 
physicians.149 Chief Judge Cole dissented, arguing the majority turned 
the restriction into a “don’t ask, don’t tell” law because it prevents 
physicians from engaging in certain conversations with their patients in 
order to avoid liability.150 The Down Syndrome abortion ban went into 
effect April 13, 2020.151  
C. Where Do Other States Fall? 
Ten other states have passed Down Syndrome or genetic abnor–
mality bans. As illustrated above, these abortion bans essentially fall 
into two categories: bans based “solely” on a Down Syndrome diagnosis 
and bans based “in part” on a Down Syndrome diagnosis. Though it is 
unnecessary to go into the details of every state’s law, it is important 
to have a general landscape of the language other states have utilized 
when enacting these abortion bans. 
Currently, Arizona, Louisiana, Kentucky, Arkansas, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah have 
enacted some form of a Down Syndrome abortion ban.152 Arkansas,153 
 
148. Id. at 521. 
149. Id. at 522–23. 
150. Id. at 551 (Cole, C.J., dissenting).  
151. Id. at 535. 
152. See generally Genetic Anomalies: Laws, Rewire News, https://rewire.news/ 
legislative-tracker/law-topic/genetic-anomalies-abortion-ban/ [https://perma 
.cc/DSL2-ZKVQ] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020) (tracking abortion restriction 
laws by state). As this Note was approaching publication, Down Syndrome 
abortion restrictions were also pending in North Carolina and Texas. See 
David Crary and Iris Samuels, Down Syndrome Abortion Bans Gain Traction 
After Court Ruling, AP News (May 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article 
/us-supreme-court-donald-trump-down-syndrome-abortion-courts-ab09552bd 
57aa5306f0341189f70b1cb (noting that the Sixth Circuit en banc decision has 
cleared the way for states to pass these types of laws).  
153. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-2103 (West 2020). One significant difference in 
the Arkansas law is that if the pregnant patient knows of any test result, the 
physician must request her medical records to determine whether she has 
previously had an abortion after becoming aware of any test results, prenatal 
diagnosis, or any other evidence that the fetus may have had Down 
Syndrome. Id. The physician is prohibited from performing an abortion until 
at least fourteen days have passed since trying to obtain the medical records 
of the pregnant woman. Id. On August 6, 2019, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas issued a preliminary injunction 
to keep the law from going into effect while the case proceeds. Little Rock 
Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (E.D. Ark. 2019). This 
was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. Little Rock Family Planning Services v. 
Rutledge, 984 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed.  
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Missouri,154 South Dakota,155 Tennessee,156 and Utah157 prohibit 
abortions solely because the fetus has or may have Down Syndrome. 
Arizona,158 Louisiana,159 Mississippi,160 and North Dakota161 have passed 
laws that prohibit abortions solely because the fetus has or may have a 
genetic abnormality.162 Kentucky’s law bans abortions when the 
physician knows the abortion is sought in part because the fetus has or 
may have Down Syndrome or any other disability.163  
 
154. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.038(2) (West 2020). The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri, upon finding that “a small number of 
women would predictably need protection during litigation,” issued a prelim–
inary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute. Planned Parenthood 
of the St. Louis Region v. Parson, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1052 (W.D. Mo. 
2019). The Eighth Circuit upheld the injunction. Planned Parenthood of the 
St. Louis Region v. Parson, Nos. 19-2882, 19-3134, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 
17099 (8th Cir. 2021).  
155. S.D. H.B. 1110, 96th Leg., Sess. 694 (S.D. 2021). 
156. H.B. 2263/S.B. 2196., 111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2020). The United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found that while the 
Sixth Circuit reviewed the Preterm-Cleveland case, a significant number of 
women would be harmed by the statue, and therefore a preliminary injunc–
tion was granted. Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery, No. 3:20-cv-
00501, 2020 WL 4274198, at *16, *21 (M.D. Tenn. July 24, 2020). However, 
in November of 2020, a three-judge panel for the Sixth Circuit issued a stay 
of the district court’s preliminary injunction and the law went into effect. 
Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery, No. 3:20-cv-00501, 2020 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 36780 (6th Cir. 2020).  
157. H.B. 166, 63d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019). The statute has what is known 
as a “trigger clause,” which means that the statute will go into effect only 
if a similar law is upheld in court elsewhere. Id. 
158. Ariz. S.B. 1457, 55th Leg., 1d Reg. (Ariz. 2021). 
159. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.1.2 (2020). The statute places criminal liability 
on a physician for performing an abortion twenty weeks post-fertilization up 
until viability on a patient knowing “the pregnant woman is seeking the 
abortion solely because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a 
genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.” Id. The United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana found that enjoin–
ing the statute would not provide relief because another state statute, La. 
Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.1(E)(1) (2020), criminalized all abortions after twenty 
weeks. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 280 F. Supp. 3d 849, 863–64 (M.D. 
La. 2017). 
160. Miss. Life Equality Act of 2020, H.B. 1295. 
161. N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-02.1-04.1 (West 2019). No lawsuits have 
been filed challenging the law. Thus, it is currently in effect. 
162. This language is much broader, and its implications are discussed infra 
notes 255–258 and accompanying text. 
163. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.731 (West 2020). The law also required 
physicians to certify in writing whether the attending physician had know–
ledge that the pregnant person was seeking the abortion, in whole or in part, 
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In October 2019, a federal Down Syndrome abortion ban bill was 
introduced in Congress.164 These proposals are at the forefront of many 
conservative lawmakers’ agendas, meaning the issue will continue to 
percolate in the court system. The hope, by both pro-life and pro-choice 
advocates, is that the Supreme Court will address the issue. Both sides 
are confident the highest court will come out on their side.165 
IV. The Breakdown of the Doctor-                  
Patient Relationship 
The choice to have an abortion is a very difficult one, and 
accordingly all parties involved have an interest in ensuring that a 
woman makes an informed choice. The choice to have the procedure 
will undoubtedly have lifelong consequences. A woman’s attitudes 
towards her abortion will be influenced by her interactions with her 
abortion provider. This Part argues that Down Syndrome abortion bans 
that place criminal liability on an abortion provider impose a restriction 
on a woman’s ability to give informed consent. The physician, to avoid 
learning information that may open him or herself up to liability, will 
be closed off, and as a result, the woman will not feel comfortable asking 
questions about the procedure. As such, these laws undermine the 
central tenets of medical ethics and place an undue burden on a woman 
seeking a pre-viability abortion. 
A. What Is the Purpose of Informed Consent? 
A patient who agrees to medical intervention must do so with an 
understanding of the risks associated with the treatment and alter–
natives so she may make a voluntary and informed choice about her 
care.166 This is known as informed consent.167 Without informed consent 
from a patient who has decision-making capacity, medical intervention 
 
due to the sex, race, or potential diagnosis of a disability. Id. The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky permanently 
enjoined the enforcement of the law. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Meier, 
373 F. Supp. 3d 807 (W.D. Ky. 2019), aff’d, EMW Women’s Surgical Center 
v. Friedlander, 960 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2020). 
164. S. 2745, 116th Cong. (2019). 
165. For a discussion on why now is a crucial time for lawmakers to challenge 
Roe v. Wade, see Jessica Ravitz, Courts Say Anti-Abortion ‘Heartbeat Bills’ 
Are Unconstitutional. So Why Do They Keep Coming?, CNN (May 16, 
2019, 9:28 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/26/health/heartbeat-bills-
abortion-bans-history/index.html [https://perma.cc/8QV2-BCBA]. 
166. Informed Consent, Am. Med. Ass’n, https://www.ama-assn.org/deliver 
ing-care/ethics/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/YNC4-77H2] (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2020). 
167. Id. 
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is not permitted.168 Common law recognized actions for trespass, 
assault, and battery against those who performed non-consensual 
medical procedures.169 Over time, United States constitutional law 
developed the right of privacy,170 which reflects “society’s concern for 
the individual’s right to be let alone, both by agents of the state and 
by private parties.”171 
The American Medical Association provides guidelines for a 
physician seeking informed consent from a patient.172 First, the 
physician should “assess the patient’s ability to understand relevant 
medical information and the implications of treatment alternatives” in 
order to make an “independent, voluntary decision.”173 Second, the 
physician should “present relevant information accurately and sensi–
tively,” keeping in mind “the patient’s preferences for receiving such 
information.”174 Third, the physician should document the conversation 
with the patient in the medical chart.175 The AMA further emphasizes 
that patients have the right to receive information and ask their phy–
sicians questions as part of the informed consent process.176 Successful 
 
168. There are, of course, instances where the patient does not have decision-
making capacity. In these cases, a physician may make decisions on behalf 
of the patient. Id. These situations most commonly occur in emergency 
situations where a patient is unconscious and there is no surrogate decision 
maker available and in pediatric cases. Id. Physicians typically make these 
decisions based on the medical condition of the patient, but sometimes non-
medical factors to influence their decision, such as the cost relative to the 
expected outcome or hospital resources. See, e.g., Monica Escher, Thomas 
V. Perneger & Jean-Claude Chevrolet, National Questionnaire Survey on 
What Influences Doctors’ Decisions About Admission to Intensive Care, 
329 Brit. Med. J. 1, 2 (2004). 
169. Jessica W. Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz & Lisa S. 
Parker, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 
41–42 (2d ed. 2001). 
170. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 passim (1990) 
(discussing state treatments of the constitutional privacy right with respect 
to state laws governing the treatment of incompetent patients); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–54, 164–65 (1973) (holding that women have a 
right to abortions before fetal viability rooted in a right of privacy); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–86 (1965) (holding that, because 
of the penumbral right to privacy, states cannot prohibit married women 
from using contraception). 
171. Berg et al., supra note 169, at 42. 





Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
A Woman’s Choice? 
872 
communication between the physician and patient helps foster trust 
and improves shared decision making.177 
Leading bioethicists Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp have noted 
that informed consent in clinical practice has two distinct frameworks: 
moral and legal. Informed consent from a moral perspective focuses on 
preserving the patient’s autonomy.178 The legal perspective focuses on 
allowing the patient to recover financially if she is injured and the 
physician did not disclose the risks of the treatment.179 Physicians have 
obligations under both moral and legal frameworks.180 A physician 
should discuss with his patient the procedure, its likelihood of success, 
the risks, and what other treatment options are available.181 The 
doctrine of informed consent evolved as a response to paternalistic 
physicians imposing their own personal views onto patients instead of 
respecting individual autonomy.182 Now, the doctrine of informed 
consent provides an avenue for patients to learn about different 
treatment options so they can make their own value-based decisions.183 
When courts evaluate what is sufficient physician disclosure for 
informed consent, most jurisdictions rely on either the “reasonable 
physician” or “reasonable patient” standard.184 Under the reasonable 
physician standard, a physician could be held liable for failing to 
disclose what a reasonable physician would have disclosed in similar 
circumstances.185 This standard mirrors that of medical malpractice and 
negligence cases, so courts are familiar with it.186 But this standard fails 
to recognize that often there is not a consensus across the medical 
 
177. Id. Shared decision making is defined as an approach where clinicians share 
the best available evidence with patients and where patients are supported 
to consider options, to achieve an informed preference. Glyn Elwyn, 
Dominick Frosch, Richard Thomson, Natalie Joseph-Williams, Amy Lloyd, 
Paul Kinnersley, Emma Cording, Dave Tomson, Carole Dodd, Stephen 
Rollnick, Adrian Edwards & Michael Barry, Shared Decision Making: A 
Model for Clinical Practice, 27 J. Gen. Internal Med. 1361, 1361 (2012). 
Informed consent and shared decision making are inextricably linked. Id. at 
1362. 
178. Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of 
Informed Consent 3 (1986). 
179. Id. 
180. Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, 
Less Heat, 21 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 19 (2011). 
181. Id. 
182. Berg et al., supra note 169, at 42. 
183. Id. at 46. 
184. Sawicki, supra note 180, at 31. 
185. Berg et al., supra note 169, at 46. 
186. Id. 
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profession about the risks that should be disclosed to a patient 
regarding certain procedures.187 Under a reasonable patient standard, a 
physician could be held liable for failing to disclose information a 
reasonable patient would deem material.188 This standard leaves 
physicians with a lot of uncertainty. But it is also beneficial because it 
compels a physician to have a discussion with his patient to ascertain 
what information she deems material.189 Sufficient disclosures under the 
informed-consent doctrine are highly dependent on social norms and 
values.190 
B. Informed Consent in the Abortion Context 
Studies consistently show that the way physicians present patients 
with information affects their decision making.191 These are known as 
framing effects.192 Studies also show that when physicians spend more 
time with the patient discussing and elaborating on the risks, benefits, 
and alternatives, the effect of physician framing goes down and the 
patient makes a more autonomous and informed decision.193 Most 
medical ethicists promote doctor and patient discussion so true 
informed consent can be obtained. 
For example, one study looked at the impact physician interactions 
had on the decisions of patients regarding cancer treatment.194 
Researchers presented participants with a scenario where they were 
diagnosed with lung cancer and the physician gave two treatment 
options: surgery or radiation.195 The results of the treatments were 
framed in one of two ways. In one group, the success of the treatment 
was described using the survival rate; in another group, the success of 
 
187. Id. at 46–47. 
188. Id. at 48. 
189. Id. at 49. 
190. Sawicki, supra note 180, at 19. 
191. See, e.g., Sammy Almashat, Brian Ayotte, Barry Edelstein & Jennifer 
Margrett, Framing Effect Debiasing in Medical Decision Making, 71 
Patient Educ. & Counseling 102, 102 (2008); Elwyn et al., supra note 
177, at 1361–62. 
192. Almashat et al., supra note 191, at 102. 
193. See id. at 106 (finding that elaboration on treatment methods, risks, and 
projected outcomes minimizes framing effects); Elwyn et al., supra note 177, 
at 1362 (noting that there have been nearly 86 case studies indicating that 
the more a patient and physician share in the decision-making process, the 
more confident the patient feels in his or her decision). 
194. Almashat et al., supra note 191, at 103. 
195. Id. at 104.  
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the treatment was described using the mortality rate.196 Patients who 
were presented information using survival rates were much more likely 
to choose the riskier procedure compared with those who were presented 
information using mortality rates for the same procedure.197 The same 
test was performed with another two groups, but this time, the 
physician elaborated more on the nature of the treatment, the risks, 
and the likelihood of success.198 The study found that the elaboration 
reduced the impact of the framing effect.199 
Similar results have emerged in the abortion setting. One study 
indicated that ninety-four percent of women who received counseling 
from their reproductive health care provider were satisfied with the 
information they received prior to their abortion.200 The study 
recommended that during these counseling sessions, physicians ask 
women open-ended questions, encourage patient questions, and validate 
women’s emotions. When women feel respected by abortion providers, 
they are more likely to communicate what additional information they 
need to make a final decision.201 These discussions can help a woman 
learn about her options and feel more confident in her ultimate choice.202 
Each state has developed its own informed-consent statutes that 
physicians must follow for a medical procedure to take place.203 But in 
the abortion context, some states have chosen to impose even stricter 
informed-consent requirements. Take, for example, Alabama’s 
Women’s Right to Know Act, which employs almost all of the possible 
informed-consent provisions in the abortion setting.204 This law requires 
that a physician give a pregnant woman seeking an abortion in–
formation about adoption agencies, fetal development, paternal 
responsibilities, and alternatives to abortion.205 A physician must then 
perform an ultrasound, and the woman has to sign a form to indicate 
she “either saw the ultrasound image or was given the opportunity and 
 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 105. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 106. 
200. Vicki Breitbart, Counseling for Medical Abortion, 183 Am. J. Obstetric 
Gynecology 26, 26 (2000). 
201. Id. at 26–28. 
202. Id. at 32. 
203. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.8 (West 2020); Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 766.103 (West 2020); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.54 (West 2017). 
204. Ala. Code § 26-23A-4 (2020). 
205. Id. 
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rejected it.”206 Once this is completed, the woman must sign a consent 
form and wait forty-eight hours before returning to have the physician 
perform the procedure.207 Thirty-three other states impose some form 
of additional requirement to informed consent in the abortion setting.208 
Abortion is not the only medical procedure over which states have 
asserted more stringent informed-consent standards. These types of 
statues often arise when there is a perceived disconnect between the 
information that physicians are conveying to their patients versus the 
type of information that should be made available to patients. For 
example, breast cancer statutes arose out of a perceived overuse of 
mastectomies in treatments of early-stage breast cancer.209 These 
statutes required physicians to provide patients with information 
regarding their diagnosis and include advantages and disadvantages of 
various treatment options.210 While these types of laws certainly 
increase information available to a patient, it is not clear how much the 
state-mandated information actually enhances the decision making of 
the patient.211 
For many, the intrusion of the state into the doctor-patient 
relationship poses concern. Robert Post wrote of the doctor-patient 
relationship, “when physicians speak to us as our personal doctors, they 




208. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.16.060(b) (West 2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 36-2153(A) (2020); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1703(a)–(b)(1) (Supp. 2019); 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.0111(3) (West 2020); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9A-3 
(West 2020); Idaho Code § 18-609 (2020); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-2-1.1 
(West 2020); Iowa Code § 146A.1 (2020); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6709 (West 
2020); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.727 (West 2020); La. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40:1061.16 (2020); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12S (West 2020); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.17015(3) (West 2020); Minn. Stat. 
§ 145.4242(a) (2020); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-34(1)(a)–(d) (West 2020); 
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.027 (West 2020); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-20-106 
(West 2019); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-327 (West 2020); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 90-21.82(a) (West 2020); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-02.1-04 (West 
2019); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 2317.56(B) (West 2017); Okla. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 63, § 1-738.8 (West 2020); 28 Pa. Code § 29.37(b)(1) (2020); 23 R.I. Gen. 
Laws Ann. § 23-4.7-5(b)(1) (West 2020); S.C. Code. Ann. § 44-41-330 
(2020); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1 (2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
15-202 (West 2020); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.013 (West 
2019); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-305 (West 2020); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-76 
(West 2020); W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-2I-2 (West 2020); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 253.10(3) (West 2019); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-6-119 (West 2020). 
209. Rachael Andersen-Watts, The Failure of Breast Cancer Informed Consent 
Statutes, 14 Mich. J. Gender & L. 201, 206–07 (2008). 
210. Id. at 211–12. 
211. Id. at 217–18. 
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icate the considered knowledge of the ‘medical community.’”212 In 
Colautti v. Franklin,213 the Supreme Court emphasized that the role of 
the abortion provider was “both in consulting with the woman about 
whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any 
abortion was to be carried out.”214 
Since Casey, states have become increasingly emboldened to enact 
laws that require physician speech in the abortion context. When the 
state has the ability to manipulate information that is being presented 
to women by physicians to help satisfy state ends, then there is cause 
for concern as to how this may affect the doctor-patient relationship.215 
Some women may think the views of the state are endorsed by her 
physician if there is not clear demarcation of what is required speech 
and what is individualized discussion.216 Furthermore, required state 
disclosures and the informed-consent discussion between the physician 
and woman often happen at the same time, which can lead to patient 
confusion.217 
C. Applying These Principles to Down Syndrome Abortion Bans 
In an abortion context involving a Down Syndrome diagnosis, there 
are arguably two types of informed consent that a woman must provide. 
First, the woman must understand the benefits and risks of the abortion 
procedure, which will be different depending on the gestational age of 
the fetus. Second, the woman must express an understanding of her 
fetus’s Down Syndrome diagnosis. 
Practically, it is difficult for abortion providers to satisfy this 
second prong of informed consent. Genetic tests are usually admin–
istered by a primary care physician or genetic counselor, who are 
 
212. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis 
of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 939, 977 (2007). 
213. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
214. Id. at 387. 
215. Sawicki, supra note 180, at 32; see also Post, supra note 212, at 977–78. 
Some argue that mandatory-disclosure laws violate a physician’s First 
Amendment right to free speech. Robert Post argues that physicians should 
be protected from state statutes that limit their speech in abortion settings 
if: (1) the statute focuses on the right of the woman to receive information; 
(2) the statute compels the professional speech of physicians; and (3) the 
state is prohibiting physicians from disclosing accurate and non-misleading 
information. Id. at 979. Post writes, “[r]egulation of informed consent thus 
controls the dissemination of knowledge, rather than the dispensation of 
medical care.” Id. at 972. 
216. Sawicki, supra note 180, at 32. 
217. Id. at 32 n.132. 
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typically unaffiliated with the abortion provider.218 So, even in cases 
where a positive Down Syndrome diagnosis is a major factor in a woman 
choosing to have an abortion, the abortion provider would not 
necessarily be privy to that information. Accordingly, either the patient 
or the physician would have to breach the topic during the informed-
consent conversation. 
It is easy to imagine a situation where a woman may bring up a 
positive Down Syndrome diagnosis on her own. Take for example a 
woman who is seeking a medical abortion. She may ask her physician 
if the abortion medication will work any differently because her fetus 
has Down Syndrome. Or in the case of a woman who needs a surgical 
abortion, she may ask if the procedure needs to be any different because 
of the anatomical differences of a Down Syndrome fetus. Though 
abortion procedures do not need to be altered because of a genetic 
abnormality,219 it is understandable why women may question if they 
do. 
But what if a woman does not bring up her fetus’s Down Syndrome 
diagnosis? In states that have Down Syndrome abortion restrictions, it 
is unclear how much of an affirmative duty an abortion physician has 
to ask a pregnant woman about any genetic test results.220 As the 
physician pries into the woman’s reasons for having an abortion, the 
conversation extends beyond the purview of informed consent. The 
“why” behind a woman’s decision to have an abortion does not relate 
to the woman’s understanding of the risks and benefits to the 
procedure, or to her understanding of a Down Syndrome diagnosis. If a 
woman discloses that she is seeking an abortion for an impermissible 
reason, it only furthers the concerns that the physician and the patient 
are no longer the only ones discussing the medical procedure—that in 
essence the state is a third party in the discussion through the 
restrictions it has placed on the physician. 
In an abortion context, the physician and patient’s values often do 
not conflict. A recent study found that 54% of abortion care providers 
felt “proud to work in abortion care ‘all of the time,’ and an additional 
29% felt proud ‘often.’”221 84% of providers felt they were making a  
218. How Is Genetic Testing Done?, MedlinePlus, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/ 
primer/testing/procedure [https://perma.cc/E6CB-U5PG] (last updated 
Sept. 18, 2020). 
219. See What Facts About Abortion Do I Need to Know?, Planned Parent–
hood, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/abortion/considering-ab 
ortion/what-facts-about-abortion-do-i-need-know [https://perma.cc/25MF-
PHEQ] (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (explaining two different abortion 
methods that hinge on how far into a pregnancy a woman is). 
220. Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 Utah L. Rev. 587, 
619–20 (2017). 
221. Lisa A. Martin, Michelle Debbink, Jane Hassinger, Emily Youatt, Meghan 
Eagen-Torkko & Lisa H. Harris, Measuring Stigma Among Abortion Pro–
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positive contribution to society “‘all the time’ or ‘often.’”222 Abortion 
providers willingly undertake the task of providing controversial 
abortions, and thus are likely to respect a woman’s right to choose. 
Physicians empathize with the moral conflicts women face, and want 
to have open discussions with their patients about the best course of 
action. 
Abortion providers, it would seem, would want to do everything in 
their power to still provide abortions while avoiding criminal liability. 
In practice, this may not be difficult. Physicians can easily frame 
questions to let women know what are impermissible reasons for seeking 
an abortion.223 Further, unless a woman outwardly admits her moti–
vations for seeking an abortion, a physician could only be prosecuted 
using circumstantial evidence, which is likely to be minimal in the 
abortion setting.224 Abortion providers typically only interact with their 
patients once or twice.225 There is little to no familiarity with a patient 
which would allow an abortion physician to challenge a woman’s 
motives for seeking the abortion.226 
Despite challenges to enforcement, threatening abortion providers 
with criminal liability will still likely change the way they interact with 
their patients. If a provider faces criminal liability for providing an 
abortion sought for an impermissible reason, that physician may be on 
edge when he interacts with a patient who he suspects may be seeking 
an abortion because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis. When a physician 
comes across to a patient as uncomfortable or not trustworthy, a 
patient is much less willing to ask questions about risks, alternatives, 
or other concerns.227 There cannot be an open discussion which allows 
for a woman to become more confident in her final choice.228 Rather, 
the woman would largely be coming to a decision to proceed with an 
abortion on her own, which can make the woman feel as if she has been 
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abandoned by her physician.229 Failure to give true informed consent is 
a significant failing in patient care. 
After considering the effects Down Syndrome abortion bans will 
likely have on women, it is clear that these laws create an undue burden. 
The Supreme Court in Casey defined an undue burden as having “the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”230 The Supreme Court 
further explained that even when a statute purports to further a 
legitimate state interest, it still poses an undue burden if it creates a 
substantial obstacle for a woman to exercise her fundamental right to 
choose.231 Down Syndrome abortion bans put the state’s interest above 
that of the woman and limit permissible discussions about the abortion 
procedure with her physician. Accordingly, a woman is deprived of the 
right to make an informed choice about whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of informed 
consent in Gonzales v. Carhart.232 Justice Kennedy wrote, “some women 
come to regret their choice to abort.”233 Justice Kennedy further wrote 
that a woman who did not give full informed consent “must struggle 
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, 
only after the event, what she once did not know.”234 Though Justice 
Kennedy’s statement comes off as paternalistic, its application to Down 
Syndrome abortion bans is still clear: a woman must give true informed 
consent so she understands the consequences of her decision to abort. 
Accordingly, open discussions between a patient and physician are 
crucial to ensure a woman understands the implications of her choice.235 
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court found a statute which 
caused those who performed pre-viability abortions to “fear prose–
cution, conviction, and imprisonment” unconstitutional.236 “The result 
is an undue burden upon a woman’s right to make an abortion 
decision.”237 Here, the Supreme Court illustrated that placing criminal 
liability on physicians can be unduly burdensome on a woman seeking 
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to exercise her right to choose. Under these Down Syndrome abortion 
bans, the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship is broken and 
instead is viewed as a criminal-victim relationship. Under the guise of 
a confidential conversation in which a woman believes she is openly 
discussing whether an abortion procedure is best for her, the physician 
is in reality ensuring she does not discuss any impermissible motivations 
for seeking an abortion. The result abortion providers face is distrust 
from patients. These external pressures will undoubtedly permeate into 
the way a physician interacts with his patients and affect a woman’s 
access to abortion care. No other medical practice is subject to this type 
of intrusion into the exam room.238 
The inability for a pregnant woman to talk openly to her physician 
and make an informed choice of whether to have an abortion places a 
substantial obstacle in her path to seek an abortion. There is no support 
for the argument that a Down Syndrome diagnosis increases the state 
interest in preserving life any more than that of a fetus without Down 
Syndrome such that it would allow the state to impose greater 
restrictions to abortion access before the viability point.239 Accordingly, 
the Down Syndrome abortion bans do nothing more than create a 
significant barrier to a woman’s access to abortion care. In her 
concurrence in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, Justice Ginsburg 
warned of the potential negative results if safe abortion access is 
restricted, writing, “[w]hen a State severely limits access to safe and 
legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to 
unlicensed rogue practitioners.”240 
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Proponents of Down Syndrome abortion bans may argue that the 
statutory language should be the deciding factor when analyzing if a 
restriction is unduly burdensome. For example, in states that have 
adopted the “in part” statutory language utilized in Ohio, the obstacle 
the law places to informed consent is clearer. The slightest indication 
of a Down Syndrome diagnosis now subjects a physician to criminal 
liability. The “in part” language creates such a low threshold for 
criminal liability, so it is easier to envision how the doctor-patient 
relationship could be undermined. 
On the other hand, some may argue that the “solely” language 
utilized in Indiana’s statute protects women’s ability to receive an 
abortion because it is less burdensome on physicians.241 As long as a 
woman can give any other permissible reason besides the Down 
Syndrome diagnosis, the procedure can proceed without the provider 
fearing criminal prosecution. Thus, it could be argued, the state interest 
in preventing eradication of Down Syndrome can be preserved while 
still allowing pre-viability abortions to proceed. The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri found this argument 
unpersuasive at a recent hearing for a preliminary injunction. “If an 
abortion were sought [after a Down Syndrome diagnosis], most of us, 
including an abortion provider, would suppose that the diagnosis was 
the principal cause of the request, and that a jury or licensing agency 
would have little trouble with the ‘sole cause’ requirement for a 
violation.”242 Accordingly, for the purposes of the informed consent 
argument, the “in part” and “solely” language have very little bearing 
on the undue-burden analysis. Any obstacle a woman faces in the 
informed-consent process is an undue burden placed on her right to 
obtain a pre-viability abortion. 
Choosing to have an abortion is one of the most intimate and 
private decisions that a woman may ever face. The Supreme Court has 
long protected the right of the woman to make this choice without 
undue governmental influence.243 Though these Down Syndrome 
abortion laws are unique in that they do not prohibit a patient from 
accessing an abortion provider, they potentially create a situation where 
a provider can be made so uncomfortable by the prospect of criminal 
liability that the back-and-forth conversation that is the staple of 
informed consent cannot happen. Informed consent is a necessary 
component to any medical procedure. Abortion restrictions that 
negatively impact the informed-consent process place an undue burden 
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on the woman exercising her right to choose whether to terminate a 
pregnancy. 
V. Other Considerations 
Some fear that allowing the abortion of Down Syndrome fetuses 
will eventually lead to fewer children being born with Down Syndrome 
in the United States, which will then lead to a less accepting society 
towards those with Down Syndrome. Some would argue that prenatal 
testing “cannot comfortably coexist with society’s professed goals of 
promoting inclusion and equality for people with disabilities.”244 Though 
these additional arguments regrettably fall beyond the purview of this 
Note, they are inextricably intertwined in the discussion of Down 
Syndrome abortion bans and thus should be briefly mentioned. 
A. Acceptance in Society 
Proponents of genetic abnormality abortion bans argue that the 
current model of prenatal testing encourages a negative view of 
disabilities in society.245 Take for example the Human Genome Project, 
which was commissioned by Congress in 1988 for the purpose of 
mapping the human genome to help discover cures for diseases and 
disabilities.246 More than thirty years later, that desired effect has not 
been achieved with genetic disabilities. “Instead of developing therapies 
or treatments for most of the genetic conditions for which the specific 
gene is known, researchers developed prenatal tests and embryo 
selection techniques that inform prospective parents about future 
children, but do nothing for anyone now living with a genetic 
condition.”247 
The general purpose of developing prenatal genetic testing is to 
provide a woman with information she can use to help her “decide 
whether to carry a particular fetus to term.”248 It is also generally 
accepted that most women, upon learning of a genetic disability, will 
not want to continue with the pregnancy.249 Consider that there are no 
tests to show a prospective mother what color hair or eyes her child 
may have, despite the scientific ability to do so.250 That is because there 
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is nothing society views as negative in what color hair or eyes someone 
is born with.251 By comparing the types of genetic screenings offered to 
expectant mothers versus what science can actually test for, the biases 
our society has against those with disabilities become apparent. 
Many leading bioethicists, such as Bonnie Steinbock, Peter Singer, 
Mary Ann Baily, and Allen Buchanan, acknowledge that problems 
encountered by people with disabilities still largely stem from the fact 
that our society has not made changes that allow for them to be fully 
integrated among their non-disabled peers.252 However, these bio–
ethicists reject arguments that prenatal testing should be avoided. 
Steinbock wrote, “disabilities are not generally advantageous, not 
something to be hoped for; indeed, they are to be avoided, if possible. 
They are not merely neutral forms of variation.”253 
The major problem with the argument that Down Syndrome 
abortion bans are discriminatory is that it focuses entirely on short–
comings in society. Abortion rights, on the other hand, are focused on 
the private right of the woman to choose whether to have a child. The 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roe that having unwanted children “may 
force upon the woman a distressful life and future”254 is applicable to 
having children with disabilities as well. Fixing a societal problem by 
restricting private choice is not the answer. Rather than legislatures 
trying to do so through abortion restrictions, it seems their efforts 
would be better served in funding accessibility and education programs 
to help address the larger issues of integration. 
B. Where Do We Draw the Line? Other Genetic              
Abnormalities and Abortion 
Another major implication that arises from Down Syndrome 
abortion bans is that they are not inclusive of other genetic abnormal–
ities. The quality of life for individuals with Down Syndrome can be 
very high: they have a higher life expectancy than before, can make 
personal connections, have jobs, and lead fulfilling lives. But what 
about other chromosomal abnormalities like cystic fibrosis, where the 
life expectancy is less than forty years?255 Or Tay-Sachs disease, where 
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most children die before their fifth birthday?256 The average life span in 
the United States is more than seventy years.257 Any parent would 
prefer that their child live a normal lifespan than die earlier.258 
Down Syndrome abortion bans place a societal value judgment on 
certain types of disabilities. If society agrees that women should not be 
permitted to abort fetuses diagnosed with Down Syndrome, then society 
is putting a higher value on those fetuses’ lives than those with other 
genetic disabilities which can be screened for by the same cell-free DNA 
test. It sends a message that Down Syndrome is a “superior” genetic 
abnormality. 
As was discussed earlier, some state statutes prohibit abortion on 
the basis of any genetic abnormality.259 But then, if these restrictions 
are permitted, society is not providing women the choice to determine 
the quality of life they want for their child. Diseases like Tay-Sachs, 
where the child has almost no chance of living past his or her fifth 
birthday, are absolutely devastating for a mother to watch her child 
experience. To expect a mother to carry and give birth to a child with 
this disease is a cruel imposition on a broad state interest.260 These 
decisions should be made on an individualized basis, without the 
government imposing their values on what a woman should do. 
Although only mentioned briefly in this Note, these additional 
arguments are still relevant in the discussion surrounding the consti–
tutionality of abortion bans based on genetic abnormalities. These laws 
undermine the well-established right to private choice and argue that 
the ideals of a society should prevail. These ethical and legal issues are 
intertwined, and as challenges to these laws continue to percolate in the 
courts, there is no doubt they will need to be addressed. 
Conclusion 
A woman’s choice to seek an abortion is a personal and private one. 
The capabilities of genetic testing have improved to inform women of 
genetic abnormalities well before a baby’s first kick, allowing for earlier 
decisions on whether an abortion may be appropriate. But, as countries 
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like Iceland have illustrated, these earlier tests have resulted in the near 
eradication of Down Syndrome from their populations.261 
Thus, the United States is challenged with trying to protect private 
interests while promoting a society that values those with disabilities. 
This Note did not attempt to address how lawmakers should handle 
this tension. But the recently passed laws that place criminal liability 
on physicians for performing an abortion on a woman who seeks the 
procedure partially or solely because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis 
places such a stress on the doctor-patient relationship that a woman’s 
ability to give informed consent will inevitably be obstructed. The 
societal interest has stretched too far into the woman’s right to privacy. 
The conversations between physician and woman will be less open and 
will impede her ability to give informed consent. Accordingly, these 
laws must be found unconstitutional because they place an undue 
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